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Abstract—P2P technology has been used widely in file and live 
media streaming sharing fields. But the architecture of P2P 
technology which we used is imperfect. In P2P system, most 
users are free-rider. They were not sharing their own resource 
because the architecture has no perfect incentive mechanism. 
Therefore, in this research, we propose a novel incentive 
mechanism (NIM) that considers useful information in social 
network and various important factors of the peers in P2P 
architecture to affect the system performance. In addition, we 
analyze the effectiveness of NIM by game theory. The 
simulation results show that deploying NIM to P2P system not 
only promotes the peers to spontaneous sharing their own 
resource but also decrease amount of free-rider.  
Keywords-P2P,Incentive mechanism, Social network, Game 
theory 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, with the emergence of P2P technology, there 
are many of the applications for P2P technology has emerged 
and how to effectively inhibit the free-riders is a hot issue. 
According to statistics, most of the P2P applications used 
Gnutella protocol and BitTorrent protocol [1][2]. BitTorrent 
uses the Choking algorithm to isolate free-riders, but 
Choking algorithm is simply giving free-riders choke. 
Gnutella uses the EigenTrust algorithm to combat free-riders. 
However according to the actuality, EigenTrust algorithm is 
not a consummated algorithm. Therefore, both of Choking 
algorithm and EigenTrust algorithm have a bed effect. A 
research was conducted in 2005, there are nearly 85 percent 
of Gnutella network users are free-riders from all users. 
Furthermore, there is only 1 percent of users voluntary to 
share new files. 
Due to the resource in the P2P applications are like 
public goods [3] that everyone can use it for free. It makes 
most of the users were not sharing their own resource, to 
cause tragedy of the commons and inefficiency. Therefore, 
in this paper, we propose an incentive mechanism on the 
basis of game theory; it promotes the peers to spontaneous 
sharing their own resource. We also use social network to 
promote users to share their resource, to maintain a long-
term cooperation between users, and also use user's 
relationship of social network to exclude free-riders.  
To deploy the mechanism to the architecture, the 
system will give users counters by considering bandwidth, 
computing power and electricity of each user. These counters 
will be stored in server and managed by server. In addition, 
the sharing model of the system can be divided into live 
media streaming sharing and file sharing. In live media 
streaming sharing, users can participate in the auction and 
using their counters to bid the tickets of high-quality live 
media streaming. In file sharing, users have to pay counters 
for every unit download bandwidth. In other words, users 
need to use the counters to bid or buy service from server. 
Therefore, the mechanism can promotes the peers to 
spontaneous sharing their own resource if they need some 
resources from server.  
The simulation results show that payoff from users 
chooses different strategies in different situations, and the 
amount of free-rider is decrease after deploying NIM to P2P 
system. The proposed mechanism not only promotes the 
peers to spontaneous sharing their own resource but also can 
enhance the transmission performance of P2P system. 
Finally, this paper proves this incentive mechanism could 
effectively inhibit the free-riders and allocation of resources 
to users more equitable. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
individually describes details of game theory and social 
network. In section III, we describe the details of the 
incentive mechanism and illustrate how users earn and spend 
their counters in the system. Section IV is simulation and 
analysis. We will conclude this paper in section V. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Game theory 
Game theory has been created by John von Neumann in 
1928. Today, it has been widely application of in various 
fields. Game theory used to analyze the rational player's 
strategies. If we divide P2P architecture based on the time 
slots, the architecture just as an indefinitely repeated games. 
Therefore, assuming all the users in P2P architecture are 
rational players, and we already know the other player’s 
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strategies, then we can define a player's best response 
[4][5][6] [7]. 
B. Social network 
Social network has risen rapidly in the year. Today, 
facebook has more than 600 million users. According to the 
researches, there are 68% of all the contact in each user’s 
social network are family, colleagues and good friends. 
Those contact persons have higher reliability, also have 
similar characteristic of space and time, and the same file 
likely interests them. Therefore, in P2P architecture, we can 
easily use characteristic of social network to promote the 
peers to spontaneous sharing their own resource and exclude 
free-riders [8][9] [10]. 
Social network is an important factor in NIM, so users 
have to operate their own social network for long time by 
sharing. Therefore, it can effectively inhibit the free-riders. If 
users don’t want to share their own resources, social network 
will cause crowding-out effect to separate the users. 
III. P2P INCENTIVE MECHANISM 
 
Figure 1.  User’s strategy state diagram 
 
Figure 2.  P2P sharing architecture 
In this research, we deploying a novel incentive 
mechanism to P2P system. In our proposed system, server 
will reference several important factors of node in each time 
slot, and give counters to nodes by according to this factor 
with certain weight value by (1). NC is the number of 
counters given to node. BC is node’s upload bandwidth 
contribution, Bshare is node’s shared upload bandwidth, Bhave 
is node’s had upload bandwidth. IS is node’s social 
networking information. PC is node’s computing power. P is 
node’s energy. DP is content popularity, it’s about number of 
times all of the node’s contents be downloaded in last time 
slot. ES is performance of P2P sharing system. T is 
veridicality of node’s contents; it can deter the malicious 
nodes.  S is stability of node; this factor will increase system 
stability. By emphasizing the factors that mentioned before, 
it can raise the satiability of system. Furthermore, the 
counters information will recode in the server and unify 
management by server. In the system, users can use these 
counters to bid or buy service from server, and the users will 
have different strategic through the counters, shown in Fig. 1. 
There are three situations, if user shared upload bandwidth 
higher than download bandwidth, he can deposit his counters; 
if user shared upload bandwidth lower than download 
bandwidth, he will spend his counters;if user shared upload 
bandwidth equal to download bandwidth, his counters was 
not change. In addition, server will choose some special 
nodes to become super-nodes by considering bandwidth and 
computing power of each node [11], they can share the 
burden of server (Fig. 2). In return, super-nodes will get 
percentage increases for counters from server. Next, we will 
introduce how user spends their counters in live media 
streaming sharing system and file sharing system. 
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A. Live media streaming sharing 
NIM adds the auction system into live media streaming 
sharing system. The mechanism will provide tickets of high-
quality live media streaming to nodes for bid. When each 
time slot is beginning, the server will secretly decide the 
number of tickets, and the total value of all tickets whether 
the server service all nodes watch low-quality live media 
streaming needed number have counters in last time slot. 
Using Dutch auction [3] to reduce the value of each ticket 
gradually till sold out all the tickets. The nodes in the auction 
don’t know the remaining number of tickets and the value of 
past transactions. The variance of revenue by Dutch auction 
might be bigger. However, in the simple shared value, the 
expected value of revenue by Dutch auction is higher. 
Therefore, the server will have sufficient performance to 
services all of nodes in the system. Server will use the lowest 
download bandwidth to provide low-quality live media 
streaming to all nodes which have no ticket with super-node 
support. The node without enough bandwidth and hardware 
resource to watch and share high-quality live media 
streaming can use the policy described in Fig. 1 to take 
strategic action. For example, a user plan watches an 
interesting high-quality sport game streaming after few days, 
but the user doesn’t have enough bandwidth and hardware 
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resource to let him share the media streaming at the same 
time. In this case, in order to achieve his purpose, the user 
can save his counters strategically few days ago. 
B. File sharing 
In this system, user has to pay corresponded counters for 
every unit download bandwidth in every time slot. The 
value of unit download bandwidth depends on proportion of 
total download bandwidth and the average download 
bandwidth last time by (2), that is ES in (1). Therefore, when 
total download bandwidth is bigger, the value of every unit 
download bandwidth will be higher. In the case of paying 
the same upload bandwidth, if the download bandwidth is 
bigger in the time slot, the counters user get will much 
higher. 
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S
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                                   (2) 
 
Lack of information is often the main reason leading to 
social dilemma occurred. The Prisoner’s Dilemma [3] in the 
game theory is a typical example. In Table I, we can easily 
observe that in the case of all player can’t communication 
and lack of information, player will choose the strategy is 
good for themselves. So, two players will choose surrender, 
and it will present the worse results. Sharing information 
will be more efficient to achieve the best results and help 
player to take strategic action. Therefore, NIM will make 
some information to public. For example, in NIM, the 
average of download bandwidth and upload bandwidth from 
all nodes, therefore, the compensation from system will not 
be underestimated, and also contribute nodes to invest their 
own resources. 
TABLE I.  PAYOFF TABLE OF THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA 
 
IV. SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS 
In this section, we will analyze NIM by game theory, 
draw diagrams for game analysis, and show the relative 
payoff from players choose different strategies. Using 
Heuristic Methods can help us to find player’s Nash 
equilibrium in NIM. Describing why the players are willing 
to share their own resources, and prove the player’s 
dominant strategy in NIM is tried their hardest to share their 
own resources. 
Today, the incentive mechanism is used by Gnutella and 
BitTorrent are defective and ineffective for inhibition of free-
riders. We assume that all players are Representative Agent, 
all players have the same strategy space, and they will get 
same payoff when they choose the same strategy. Therefore, 
we can use Fig. 3 to describe this game which has many 
players. In this game, free-riders don’t need to pay any of 
their own resources but also can have a minimum download 
bandwidth. Comparing to the normal peers, free-riders get 
higher payoff, when the proportion of free-riders to rise in 
this game, the payoff to decrease for all players. The 
dominant strategy shows that everyone will be a free-rider, 
and this result is similar to the actual situation. 
 
Figure 3.  Pay  off analysis of traditional P2P sharing game 
Player A’s payoff in NIM is shown in Table II. Because 
we propose counters system for all players to earn by share 
their own resources, and strategy saving or purchase of 
services, free-riders cannot get any resources in NIM. The 
dominant strategy for all players is obvious to be normal peer. 
The design of Nash equilibrium for all players is cooperative 
and shares their own resources. Therefore, free-riders do not 
exist in NIM. 
TABLE II.  PLAYER A’S PAYOFF IN NIM 
 
 
In this section, we will analyze NIM; include strategy 
space and payoff for each player in different situation. First, 
we assume all players have the same resource and focus on 
social network to analyze. There are player AˣBˣC and D, 
their social network relationship are shown in the Fig. 4. 
Player AˣB and C are in the same social network, and 
player C and D are in the same social network. Each player 
can choose cooperate or betray as his strategy. Payoff matrix 
is shown in Table III. There is Nash equilibrium in this table. 
In this table, all of players choose to cooperate. Once the 
player chooses to betray other players, the player would be 
excluded by social network. And that will continue to affect 
social network in the future. Therefore, the player, which is 
betrayer, will get the lowest payoff. In which we notice that 
the only player C and D have social network relationship, so, 
when player C chooses to betray D, player D will lose social 
network with player A and B at the same time. Therefore, 
player D has to build his social network relationship with 
other players for better payoff as possible as he can. 
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Figure 4.  Social network relationship of player AǃBǃC and D 
TABLE III.  PLAYER’S PAYOFF TABLE WITH SOCIAL NETWORK 
 
Next, we focus on the performance of P2P sharing 
system (ES), strategy space is increase/decrease 
upload/download bandwidth, and player’s payoff is shown in 
Fig. 5. We can easily find that when ES is bigger than 1, the 
dominant strategy for all players is increased upload 
bandwidth. When ES is smaller than 1, dominant strategy for 
all players is increase download bandwidth. Therefore, the 
system will be more balance by factors ES, but also propose 
better reason to players to share their own resources in 
sharing live media streaming of big sport games. 
 
Figure 5.  Payoff analysis based on the performance of P2P sharing system 
(ES) 
Payoff of the different players which have different 
upload bandwidth resources and choosing different strategies 
are shown in Fig. 6. We can find out no matter how many 
upload bandwidth resources players got, the upload 
bandwidth players shared the similar upload bandwidth 
resources from all. This will lead the payoff become well. 
Therefore, dominant strategy for all players is trying hard to 
share all of their own upload bandwidth resources. In this 
way, if someone is in developing countries, will not be 
limited the low bandwidth resources, also can obtain a fair 
payoff. 
 
Figure 6.  Payoff analysis based on bandwidth contribution (BC) 
Finally, we simulate counters change the value of six 
players AˣBˣ CˣDˣ E and F to choose different 
strategies in NIM in twenty time slots. It is shown in Fig. 7. 
Table IV shows the parameter setting of six players. Player 
A is a new node which just joins this incentive mechanism, 
he have limited data to share. Player B shares all of his own 
upload bandwidth resources. Player C’s income is equal to 
expenditure. Player D is super-node with the additional 
bonus. Player E chooses to strategically save his counters. 
Player F is free-rider. Due to player A is a new node which 
just joins NIM, system will give him some preferential 
treatment, so beginning of player A join NIM, he have 100 
counters and he will spend it to download the data with high 
popularity, and then earn counters after fifth time slot. Player 
E strategically saves his counters to buy the tickets of high-
quality live media streaming in the fifteenth time slot; 
therefore, his expenditure will increase to 150 and stop to 
share his own upload bandwidth resources after fifteenth 
time slot. 
In NIM, player A can spend preferential counters from 
system to download the data with high popularity and earn 
counters by sharing it. Player B has better payoff by sharing 
all of his own upload bandwidth resources. Player C chooses 
to share upload bandwidth resources equal to download 
bandwidth which he needs. Player D chooses to be a super-
node and help server to manage system by share his upload 
bandwidth and computing resources, so system also gives 
additional bonus counters to him. Player E strategically saves 
his counters for download high-quality live media streaming, 
therefore, when he downloads high-quality live media 
streaming, he also can stop sharing to keep his own resources. 
Player F doesn’t share any upload bandwidth resources, so 
he will run out all of counters which he has within a short 
time and excluded by system. 
TABLE IV.  SIMULATION PARAMETERS 
 A B C D E F 
NC 100 10 10 10 10 100
ES 1 1 1 1 1 1 
BC 1 2 1 2 2 0 
IS 1 1 1 1 1 1 
DP 02 1 1 1 1 1 
PC 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
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P 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
T 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
S 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Bonus 0% 0% 0% 50% 0% 0%
Spend/Round 15 10 10 15 0150 10 
 
 
Figure 7.  Simulation result 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This research proposes a new incentive mechanism, to 
solve the free-rider problem in traditional P2P file sharing 
applications. We use the counter system to convert important 
contribution of each node into counters, and trade counters 
for service. This mechanism also uses the properties of social 
network to natural exclude free-riders and promotes the 
spontaneous cooperation between users. Therefore, this 
mechanism can comprehensive solve the free-rider problem, 
at the same time fair share resources to all users. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
This research sponsored by National Science Council, 
Project No. NSC 99-2221-E-032-032-MY3.  
 
REFERENCES 
[1] Obele, B.O., Ukaegbu, A.I., Minho Kang, “On Tackling Free-Riders 
in P2P Networks,” Advanced Communication Technology, 2009. 
[2] Rozario, F., Zhu Han, Niyato, D., “Optimization of non-cooperative 
P2P network from the game theory point of view,” Wireless 
Communications and Networking Conference (WCNC), 2011. 
[3] Guillermo Owen “Game theory, ” New York, Academic Press, 1995 
[4] Huibin Feng, Shunyi Zhang, Chao Liu, Junrong Yan, Ming Zhang, 
“P2P Incentive Model On Evolutionary Game Theory,” Wireless 
Communications, Networking and Mobile Computing, 2008. 
[5] Ouyang Jing-cheng, Wang Yue-bin, Hu Xu-huai, Lin Ya-ping, “An 
Incentive Mechanism Using Game Theory for P2P Networks,” 
Networks Security, Wireless Communications and Trusted 
Computing, 2009. 
[6] Chunzhi Wang, Ke Zhou, Hongwei Chen, Li Chen, “A Game Model 
of P2P Based on Punishment Strategies,” Information Engineering 
and Electronic Commerce (IEEC), 2010. 
[7] Jaeok Park, van der Schaar, M., “A Game Theoretic Analysis of 
Incentives in Content Production and Sharing Over Peer-to-Peer 
Networks,” IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Signal 
Processing, 2010. 
[8] Altmann, J., Bedane, Z.B., “A P2P File Sharing Network Topology 
Formation Algorithm Based on Social Network Information,” 
INFOCOM Workshops, 2009. 
[9] Abboud, Osama, Zinner, Thomas, Lidanski, Eduardo, Pussep, 
Konstantin, Steinmetz, Ralf, “StreamSocial: A P2P Streaming System 
with Social Incentives,” IEEE International Symposium on A World 
of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks (WoWMoM), 2010. 
[10] Mehdi Mani, Anh-Minh Ngyuen, Noël Crespi, “What’s up: P2P 
Spontaneous Social Networking,” IEEE International Conference on 
Pervasive Computing and Communications, 2009. 
[11] Jongtack Kim, Yugyung Lee, Saewoong Bahk, “SALSA: Super-Peer 
Assisted Live Streaming Architecture,” IEEE International 
Conference on Communications, 2009. 
 
919
